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Defining The Ethical Limits of
Acceptable Deception in Mediation*
John W. Cooley**
In a recent law review article I authored for the Loyola University of Chi-
cago Law Review, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse,' I addressed the per-
plexing problem of the current lack of ethical guidance available to mediators
and mediation advocates on the question of permissible uses of deception in
mediation generally and in caucused mediation, in particular.2
This article is a sequel to that publication, offering the reader a condensa-
tion of some of the ideas contained in that article and some additional thoughts
on criteria that might be appropriate to consider when designing a truthfulness
standard for mediation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deception has been defined generally as "the business of persuasion aided
by the art of selective display," and it is affected by two principal behaviors:
hiding the real and showing the false.3 Deception of various types is generally
* This article was previously published by "Brief', the Journal of the Dupage County Bar
Association, Illinois (11,29).
** John W. Cooley is a former United States Magistrate, Assistant United States Attorney,
Senior Staff Attorney for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and a partner in
a Chicago law firm. He is the immediate past President of the Chicago Chapter of the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution. In private practice in the Chicago area, he currently serves on
the judicial panel of Judicial Dispute Resolution, Inc. (JDR) as a mediator, arbitrator, ADR trainer,
consultant in the design of dispute resolution systems, and he is an Associate of the Dispute Resolu-
tion Research Center, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. An
Adjunct Professor of Law at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, he has co-designed and
co-taught an innovative course on Alternatives to Litigation. He is the author of Mediation Advocacy
(National Institute for Trial Advocacy, 1996), co-author with Northwestern University Law Profes-
sor Steven Lubet of Arbitration Advocacy (NITA, 1997), The Arbitrator's Handbook (forthcoming,
NITA, Fall, 1998), and Callaghan's Appellate Advocacy Manual (Clark Boardman Callaghan,
1989), and author of numerous articles on litigation, judicial, and ADR topics. He is a graduate of
the United States Military Academy at West Point and the University of Notre Dame Law School,
receiving a year of his legal training at the School's Centre for Legal Studies in London, England.
I. John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. I (1997).
2. Caucused mediation is a commonly employed type of mediation procedure in which the
mediator conducts separate and private discussions with the parties and their counsel. See generally,
DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES 68 (Little, Brown and Co., 1996).
3. See DAVID NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH: TRUTH TELLING AND DECEIVING IN
ORDINARY LIFE 66-67 (1992); J. BARTON BOWYER, CHEATING: DECEPTION IN WAR & MAGIC,
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accepted as integral to the American way of life.4 "White lies" permeate all
aspects of social practice: "How nice to see you!" - when it is not; giving false
excuses in response to invitations or requests in order to avoid hurt feelings;
flattering the ordinary; bestowing a cheerful interpretation on depressing cir-
cumstances; showing gratitude for unwanted gifts; teachers giving inflated
grades; employers preparing inflated evaluations or recommendations. '
Modern society tolerates outright lying in a variety of circumstances. In
some circles, lying is justified when it avoids harm, produces an overriding
benefit, maintains fairness, or preserves confidence or reputation.6 Widely ac-
ceptable deceptive behaviors in our society include: lying to protect oneself or
someone else from physical harm, the government using undercover agents,
lawyers manipulating facts in arguments before juries, physicians withholding
information from dying patients to spare them fear and anxiety, and parents
concealing from children for years that there really isn't an Easter Bunny or a
Santa Claus - at least one that rides in an airborne sleigh and comes down the
chimney.
The point is that both society, in general, and, as will be made clearer infra,
the legal profession in particular, consider many types of deception acceptable.
The purpose of this article is to explore what the ethical limits of acceptable
deception in mediation, and by inclusion negotiation, should be.
II. THE PROBLEM
This article proceeds from the premise that consensual deception is the es-
sence of caucused mediation. This statement should not come as a shock to the
reader when it is considered in the context of the nature and purpose of caucus-
ing. Actually, it is quite rare that caucused mediation, a type of informational
game, occurs without the use of deception by the parties, by their lawyers,
and/or by the mediator in some form.7 This is so for several reasons.
First, a basic ground rule of the information system operating in any medi-
ated case in which there is caucusing is that confidential information conveyed
to the mediator by any party cannot be disclosed by the mediator to anyone
GAMES & SPORTS, SEX & RELIGION, BUSINESS & CON GAMES, POLITICS & ESPIONAGE, ART &
SCIENCE 48-49 (1982).
4. See NYBERG, supra note 3, at 66. See also LYING AND DECEPTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saami eds., 1993); DECEPTION: PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN AND
NONHUMAN DECEIT (Robert W. Mitchell & Nicholas S. Thompson eds., 1988).
5. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 58-59 (1989).
6. Id. at 76.
7. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 128-29, 359-60 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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(with narrowly limited exceptions).8 This means that: (1) each party in media-
tion rarely, if ever, knows whether another party has disclosed confidential in-
formation to the mediator; and (2) if confidential information has been dis-
closed, the non-disclosing party never knows the specific content of that confi-
dential information and whether and/or to what extent that confidential informa-
tion has colored or otherwise affected communications coming to the non-
disclosing party from the mediator. In this respect, each party in a mediation is
an actual or potential victim of constant deception regarding confidential infor-
mation - granted, agreed deception - but nonetheless deception. This is the
central paradox of the caucused mediation process. The parties, and indeed even
the mediator, agree to be deceived as a condition of participating in it in order to
find a solution that the parties will find "valid" for their purposes.9
Second, mediation rarely occurs absent deception because the parties (and
their counsel) are normally engaged in the strategies and tactics of competitive
bargaining during all or part of the mediation conference, and the goal of each
party is to get the best deal for himself or herself.'l
These competitive bargaining strategies and tactics are layered and inter-
laced with the mediator's own strategies and tactics to get the best resolution
possible for the parties - or at least a resolution that they can accept. The con-
fluence of these, initially anyway, unaligned strategies, tactics, and goals creates
an environment rich in gamesmanship and intrigue, naturally conducive to the
use of deceptive behaviors by the parties and their counsel, and yes, even by
mediators. Actually, even more so by mediators because they are the conductors
- the orchestrators - of an information system specially designed for each
dispute, a system with ambiguously defined or, in some situations, undefined
disclosure rules in which the mediator is the Chief Information Officer who has
near-absolute control over what nonconfidential information, critical or other-
wise, is developed, what is withheld, what is disclosed, and when it is disclosed.
As mediation pioneer Christopher Moore has noted: "The ability to control,
manipulate, suppress, or enhance data, or to initiate entirely new information,
gives the mediator an inordinate level of influence over the parties. ' ' "
8. See JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 263-80 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1984).
9. See Robert D. Benjamin, The Constructive Uses of Deception: Skills, Strategies, and
Techniques of the Folkloric Trickster Figure and Their Application by Mediators, 13 MEDIATION Q.
3,15-16 (1995).
10. See CHRISTOPHER M. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 35-43 (San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers, 1986).
II. Id. at 269.
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Third, the information system manipulated by the mediator in any dispute
context is itself imperfect. Parties, rarely, if ever, share with the mediator all the
information relevant, or even necessary, to the achievement of the mediator's
goal - an agreed resolution of conflict."2 The parties' deceptive behavior in
this regard - jointly understood by the parties and the mediator in any media-
tion to fall within the agreed "rules of the game" - sometimes causes media-
tions to fail or prevents optimal solutions from being achieved. 3
Thus, if agreed deception is a central ingredient in caucused mediation, the
question then becomes what types of deception should be considered construc-
tive, within the rules of the mediation game, and ethically acceptable and what
types should be considered destructive, beyond the bounds of fair play, and ethi-
cally unacceptable. Or, perhaps more simply, in the words of mediator Robert
Benjamin, in mediation what are the characteristics of the "noble lie" - decep-
tion "designed to shift and reconfigure the thinking of disputing parties, espe-
cially in the conflict and confusion, and to foster and further their cooperation,
tolerance, and survival?"' 4 Because formal mediation is generally viewed as
"nothing more than a three-party or multiple-party negotiation,"' 5 we can begin
to formulate an answer to this question by examining the current limits of ac-
ceptable deception as employed by lawyer-negotiators.
III. ACCEPTABLE DECEPTION BY LAWYER-NEGOTIATORS
The launch point for our exploration of the ethical norms governing the ex-
tent to which a lawyer must be truthful in negotiations is Rule 4.1 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 4.1 provides:
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid as-
sisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
In relation to lawyers representing clients in negotiation, there is a wide
chasm dividing expert opinion on the applicable standard of truthfulness. 6 At
one extreme on the "truthfulness spectrum," Judge Alvin B. Rubin of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, writing in the mid-I 970s, proposed
12. Id. at 187-98.
13. Id. at 189.
14. Benjamin, supra note 9, at 17.
15. Id. at 12.
16. See generally Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in Negotiation, 8
REV. LITIG. 173 (1989). See also Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 493 (1989).
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two "precepts" to guide a lawyer's conduct in negotiations: (I) "The lawyer
must act honestly and in good faith," and (2) 'The lawyer may not accept a re-
sult that is unconscionably unfair to the other party."' 7 In 1980, Professor James
J. White published an article in which he asserted his belief that misleading the
other side is the very "essence of negotiation" and is all part of the game. 8
White observed that truth is a relative concept that depends on the definition one
chooses and the circumstances of the negotiator. 9 He further pointed out that
lawyers hunt "for the rules of the game as the game is played in the particular
circumstance. '20 He identified the paradox of the lawyer's goal in negotiation
- how to "be fair but also mislead."'" In 1981, Yale Law Professor Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., principal draftsman of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
after reviewing Judge Rubin's and Professor White's articles and other pertinent
literature of the day concluded that "legal regulation of trustworthiness cannot
go much further than to proscribe fraud."2 2 In 1982, Professor Thomas F.
Guernsey sought a middle-ground solution. He suggested that conventions re-
garding truthfulness dilemmas be formulated to guide those lawyers aspiring to
be ethical, but that the default standard in all negotiations should be "caveat
lawyer. '23 More recently, other commentators have advocated various truthful-
ness standards for lawyers in negotiation in terms of "total candor"; 24 of avoid-
ing "creating an unreasonable risk of harm"; 25 of forbidding all deception;26 of
"permissible conventions of untruthfulness";27 of allowing "advantageous results
... consistent with honest dealings with others"; 28 of "the golden rule" - recip-
17. Alvin Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers" Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 589
(1975).
18. James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 928.
19. ld. at 929-31.
20. Id. at 929.
21. Id. at 928.
22. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer"s Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing with
Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 196 (1981).
23. Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 103 (1982).
24. Professor Walter W. Steele, Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 1387, 1403 (1986).
25. Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers" Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 133-34
(1985).
26. Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. I, 50 (1987).
27. Dahl, supra note 16, at 199.
28. Ruth Fleet Thurman, Chipping Away at Lawyer Veracity: The ABA's Turn Toward Situa-
tion Ethics in Negotiations, 1990 J. OF DISPUTE RESOL. 103, 115 (1990).
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rocal candor;29 of defining "what is not a lie is and what lies are ethically per-
missible."3
These varying perceptions of what standards of truthfulness should guide
lawyers' conduct in representing a client in negotiation offer little by way of
identifying the standards that do currently guide them. Under Model Rule 4.1
(a), what exactly is a false statement of material fact in negotiation? What is a
false statement of law? And, under subparagraph (b) of that rule, when is a law-
yer's disclosure of a material fact necessary to avoid a client's fraudulent act in
negotiation? Pertinent Comments of Model Rule 4.1 provide little help in an-
swering these questions.
The Comments actually complicate the search for answers to the questions
presented by the text of Model Rule 4.1 and the formal and informal Recent
Ethics Opinions published by the ABA similarly offer little assistance in inter-
preting Model Rule 4. 1's application to a lawyer's permissible conduct in nego-
tiation.
Determining what constitutes unethical conduct is also difficult because of
numerous excuses and justification lawyers typically marshal for lying in nego-
tiation3 and the plethora of well-recognized negotiation strategies and tactics
that have developed in recent years. Such strategies and tactics are widely con-
sidered to be within the rules of the negotiation game. Lawyers have names for
them; law books describe them in detail, law professors teach them to students
in law school.32 Many of these strategies and tactics rely for the effectiveness on
techniques of timed disclosure, partial disclosure, nondisclosure, and overstated
and understated disclosures of information - all of which involve degrees of
deception.33 Their effectiveness is also dependent on lawyer's avoidance tech-
niques and on subtle distinctions between what information consists of facts as
opposed to what is lawyer's opinion.34 "Puffing" - a type of deception - is
generally thought to be within the permissible limits of a lawyer's ethical con-
duct in negotiation,35 yet even with puffing, at some mysterious, undefined point
the line may be crossed and "the lack of competing inferences makes the state-
ment a lie."36
29. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A
Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 782 (1990).
30. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1272
(1990).
31. Id.atl236toend.
32. See TED A. DONNER & BRIAN L. CROWE, ATTORNEY'S PRACTICE GUIDE TO
NEGOTIATIONS Chs. II and 12 (2d ed., 1995).
33. See id.
34. Guernsey, supra note 23, at 105-127.
35. Wetlaufer, supra note 30, at 1244-45.
36. Guernsey, supra note 23, at 107-08.
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An article published in 1988 poignantly illustrates the differences of opin-
ion and confusion among the experts regarding truthfulness standards in negotia-
tion.37 Using four hypothetical negotiation situations, the author conducted a
survey of fifteen participants, which included eight law professors who had writ-
ten on ethics and negotiation, or both; five experienced litigators, a federal cir-
cuit court judge, and a U.S. Magistrate. The chart below contains the four situa-
tions and shows how the fifteen experts answered the ethical question posed by
each of the situations.
Situation 1 Your clients, the defendants, have told you that you are author-
ized to pay $750,000 to settle the case. In settlement negotiations after your
offer of $650,000, the plaintiffs' attorney asks, "Are you authorized to settle for
$750,000?" Can you say, "No I'm not?"
Yes: Seven No: Six Qualified: Two
Situation 2 You represent a plaintiff who claims to have suffered a serious
knee injury. In settlement negotiations, can you say your client is "disabled"
when you know she is out skiing?"
Yes: One No: Fourteen Qualified: None
Situation 3 You are trying to negotiate a settlement on behalf of a couple
who charge that the bank pulled their loan, ruining their business. Your clients
are quite up-beat and deny suffering particularly severe emotional distress. Can
you tell your opponent, nonetheless, that they did?
Yes: Five No: Eight Qualified: Two
Situation 4 In settlement talks over the couple's lender liability case, your
opponent's comments make it clear that he thinks plaintiffs have gone out of
business, although you didn't say that. In fact, the business is continuing and
several important contracts are in the offing. You are on the verge of settlement;
can you go ahead and settle without correcting your opponent's misimpression?
Yes: Nine No: Four Qualified: Two
In the midst of all this confusion and disagreement about the appropriate
truthfulness standard, one could reasonably conclude, as apparently did Profes-
sor Hazard, that with respect to negotiation, the present ethical norms for law-
yers do little more than proscribe fraud in negotiation - or, at most, they pro-
scribe only very serious, harmful misrepresentations of material fact made
37. See Larry Lempert, In Settlement Talks, Does Telling the Truth Have Its Limits? 2 INSIDE
LITIGATION 1 (1988).
269
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through a lawyer's false verbal or written statement, affirmation, or silence.
Assuming that this is the current standard of truthfulness for lawyers who are
advocates in negotiation, the question then becomes: does this same standard of
truthfulness apply to lawyers who are advocates in mediation, as opposed to
negotiation? To that topic, we now turn.
IV. ACCEPTABLE DECEPTION BY MEDIATION ADVOCATES
Very little has been written about the ethical standards for lawyers who rep-
resent clients in mediation, much less the standards of truthfulness which should
guide them.38 Nothing in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct for
lawyers addresses lawyer truthfulness in mediation. In mediation, of course, the
advocate's duty of truthfulness has to be measured not only in relation to "oth-
ers" but also a special kind of "other" - a neutral who is sometimes a judge or a
former judge. Thus, two questions emerge: (1) do the ethical standards for
truthfulness in negotiation described in the immediately preceding section also
govern the advocate's truthfulness behavior vis-a-vis the opponents in media-
tion; and (2) do those ethical standards also govern the advocate's truthfulness
behavior vis-a-vis a neutral (lawyer, nonlawyer, or judge) in mediation?
First, since the Model Rules are silent on the truthfulness standards for me-
diation advocates vis-A-vis their opponents, one would seemingly be safe in
concluding that the rules regarding truthfulness in negotiation apply. However,
one could make a persuasive argument that a heightened standard of truthfulness
by advocates in mediation should apply because of the "deception synergy"
syndrome resulting from a third-party neutral's involvement. We know from
practical experience that the accuracy of communication deteriorates on succes-
sive transmissions between and among individuals. Distortions also have a ten-
dency to become magnified on continued transmissions. Also, we know from
the available behavioral research concerning mediator strategies and tactics that
mediators tend to embellish information, translate it, and sometimes distort it to
meet the momentary needs of their efforts to achieve a settlement. To help pro-
tect against "deception synergy" perhaps we should require more truthfulness
from mediation advocates and commensurately require more truthfulness of
mediators. But the practicality of such a proposal is questionable. Can we rea-
sonably expect advocates to behave any differently in mediation than they do in
negotiation? Would such truthfulness distinctions be impossible to define and
even less possible to enforce? It seems very likely. Thus, it appears that the
standards governing advocates' truthfulness in negotiation vis-a-vis each other
would also govern their conduct in mediation. Second, with respect to truthful-
ness standards for mediation advocates vis-A-vis the mediator, apparently the
38. See JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY (NITA, 1996); ERIC GALTON,
REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION, (Dallas, Tex. Texas Lawyer Press, 1994).
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only available guidance having even a modicum of applicability appears to be
Model Rule 3.3, "Candor Toward the Tribunal." It is arguable, of course, that
Rule 3.3 applies only to court tribunals which adjudicate matters in a public
forum - and not to mediators, special masters, part-time judges, or former
judges, and the like, who conduct settlement conferences. If that is the intent of
this rule, the Model Rules do not specifically say so. Nowhere do they define
"tribunal." It is not even clear whether Rule 3.3 applies to a lawyer's conduct
before a private tribunal consisting of an arbitrator or arbitrators, although it
reasonably could be. If they do apply in arbitration, would they also apply in
hybrid ADR processes, such as med-arb or binding mediation? While it is true
that the Comments to the above-quoted Rule 3.3 make no reference to settle-
ment conference or mediation, it is also true that they do not explicitly exclude
settlement conferences and/or mediation from its coverage.
Other Model Rules further obfuscate the scope of the coverage of Model
Rule 3.3. For example, Comments to Rule 3.9, "Advocate in Nonadjudicative
Proceedings," refers to "court" and not "tribunal," except administrative tribu-
nal. So the question becomes: is "court" different in meaning than the unmodi-
fied term "tribunal"? Comment [11 to Rule 1.12, "Former Judge or Arbitrator,"
defines "adjudicative officer" as including such officials as judges pro tempore,
referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and
also lawyers who serve as part-time judges." Is the term "tribunal" then broader
than "adjudicative officer"? That is, does the unmodified term "tribunal" in-
clude both "adjudicative" and "nonadjudicative" officers? If so, would media-
tors or settlement officers fall within the scope of "nonadjudicative" officers,
thus making Rule 3.3 applicable to mediators? For those readers who believe
this analysis is an exercise in tautology, you may be correct. The objective of all
this is to make two important points: (1) the current Model Rules are currently
thoroughly deficient in providing guidance to mediation advocates on what their
truthfulness behavior should be vis-a-vis mediators (whether or not the media-
tors are judges, former judges, or court-appointed neutrals); and (2) if Model
Rule 3.3 were deemed to apply to mediation advocates, it would significantly
enhance the standards of advocates' truthful ness-to-mediator responsibilities,
most probably to the point that no advocate would find it sensible to participate
in the mediation process. This describes the current state of affairs regarding
mediation advocates, but what about mediators?
V. ACCEPTABLE DECEPTION BY MEDIATORS
Neither the Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility of the Society
of Professionals in Dispute Resolution ("Ethical Standards" nor the Model Stan-
9
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dards of Conduct for Mediators ("Model Standards") prepared by a joint com-
mittee of the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association,
and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution addresses the question of
how truthful a mediator must be in conducting a mediation. The Ethical Stan-
dards merely make a passing reference to a duty they owe to the parties, to the
profession, and to themselves and state that mediators "should be honest and
unbiased, act in good faith, be diligent, and not seek to advance their own inter-
ests at the expense of their parties."39 The Ethical Standards contain no explana-
tion of what "honest" means.
The Model Standards are similarly void of any specific guidance to the me-
diator regarding standards for truthfulness. They do, however, provide general
guidance to the mediator in handling confidential information. Thus, while the
Model Standards come closer than the Ethical Standards toward the topic of
mediator truthfulness, the Model Standards fail to address this crucial topic di-
rectly, opting, perhaps wisely for the time being, to keep standards regarding the
matter vague and ambiguous. Although the Model Standards recognize that the
parties and the mediator may have their "own rules" regarding confidentiality
and that the mediator should discuss the nature of private sessions and confiden-
tiality with the parties, they do not identify any specific information or types of
information that must, at a minimum, be communicated regarding confidential-
ity rules or the private session procedure in order to be in ethical compliance
with the Model Standards. And perhaps just as importantly, the Model Stan-
dards, unlike the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers (as
discussed infra), do not identify or define any specific type or types of mediator
untruthfulness that is intended to be ethically proscribed.
Thus, mediators - lawyers and nonlawyers - currently have no specific
formal guidance regarding how truthful they must be in conducting mediations.
Put another way, they do not know exactly what kinds of mediator deception is
acceptable, ethically, and what kinds are not. This is an important realization.
The role of mediator which is quickly becoming an adjunct or full-time practice
area for thousands of lawyers across the United States currently has no uniform,
ethical standards officially sanctioned by the American Bar Association.
Despite this serious lack of guidance, even if lawyer-mediators were to look
to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (August, 1990) to find analogous
guidance for themselves as to required standards of truthfulness to guide their
specific behavior in conducting mediations, they would be disappointed to find
that there are none. 4° Remarkably, no canon or commentary of the ABA's
Model Code of Judicial Conduct offers any specific guidance regarding a
39. Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility, Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution (Adopted June 1986), "General Responsibilities."
40. See generally, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBET, & JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS (2d. ed. 1995).
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judge's duty to be truthful to others, although such requirement might be pre-
sumed from Canon I which states that "a judge shall uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary." But that requirement is so general as to be of no
utility whatsoever to our inquiry here.
VI. SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS CONFRONTING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
REGARDING REQUIRED STANDARDS OF TRUTHFULNESS IN MEDIATION
The above discussion of the legal profession's minimal regulation of the use
of deception in mediation triggers some very important questions about what
standards of truthfulness should be developed to guide mediators and mediation
advocates in performing their functions. Here is a short list that immediately
comes to mind:
To what standards of truthfulness should a mediator be held?
What types of deception are constructive, within the bounds of fair play,
and acceptable?
What types of deception are destructive, outside the bounds of fair play, and
unacceptable?
Should there be different standards of truthfulness in mediation for lawyers
and nonlawyers?
Should the standards of truthfulness be any different for the lawyer-
mediator than the lawyer-advocate in either negotiation or mediation?
Should there be different standards of truthfulness for a mediator when par-
ties are unrepresented by legal counsel?
To what standards of truth and honesty should a judge who conducts a set-
tlement conference be held?
Should the standards be higher than the non-judge mediator -- lawyer or lay
person?
Should a judge who conducts a caucused settlement conference in a case be
ethically precluded from deciding a case on the merits?
Should mediators be held to a higher level of truth or honesty when they are
appointed by a judge to conduct the mediation?
Should lawyer-advocates be held to a higher level of truth and honesty
when representing a client in a mediation where the mediator is court-
appointed?
Should mediators (lawyers, nonlawyers, or judges) be required to explain
certain "rules of the mediation game" before the mediation begins?
If "game rules" should be explained, of what would they consist?
Would the "game rules" vary depending on the sophistication of the parties?
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Would the "game rules" vary depending on whether the parties were repre-
sented by legal counsel?
VII. SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS REGARDING THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS TO
THESE QUESTIONS
If you set about to define rules of a game, you must take care to ensure that
those rules:
" are compatible with the game's nature and its purpose;
" do not significantly interfere with the means by which the players can
accomplish the game's purpose;
" are comprehensible, reasonable, and fair; and
" are capable of compliance by all of the game's players in all situations.
Otherwise - depending on the degree of inappropriateness of the rules -
the game will not be played, the rules will be ignored, they will not be enforced,
or their application and enforcement will result in unfair treatment of some of
the players. For example, if you prescribed a new rule in basketball that all
shots at the basket must be taken from a point behind the centerline of the court,
many players might decide not to play the game anymore. They might opt for
some other sport. Or, if you required that the basketball be dribbled no more
than ten times between passes, players and the referees might have trouble keep-
ing track of the dribble count and the rule might not be enforced. Or, if it were
enforced, it might be enforced nonuniformly, leading to player discontentment
and possibly to abandonment of the game.
Similarly, when designing rules to govern ethical conduct in mediation (and
by inclusion, negotiation), one must be careful to balance the rigor of an im-
posed duty, on the one hand, against the reasonable likelihood of compliance in
the context in which the duty is to be fulfilled, on the other. To impose an ethi-
cal rule in negotiation and mediation that charges lawyers (and non-lawyers)
with a duty antithetical to the nature and purpose of these processes, that is in-
comprehensible, unreasonable, or unfair, and/or that is incapable of compliance
by many of the people it is designed to regulate would be a futile act. People
would not comply with it, and if such rule or rules were enforced, people would
not play the mediation game. They would litigate in court as much as possible.
So, our goal should be to find the described balance as derivable from the four
rule-making criteria appearing at the outset of this section.
A. Rules must be compatible with the game's nature and purpose
Let's first consider the nature and purpose of mediation. The nature of me-
diation is an information management process and its purpose is to resolve con-
274
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flict. The process is not static; rather it is dynamic in the sense that, in it, parties
continuously develop and share information face-to-face or through the media-
tor. Infusion of new information may cause the parties to rethink what, at any
particular moment, their risks are and what they really desire in the settlement.
In some situations, these changes may literally occur minute-to-minute. Truth
may likewise change from minute-to-minute. What is true for a party in media-
tion now, may not be true for a party 15 minutes from now in the same media-
tion. So, in designing ethical rules, we must keep clearly in mind that truth, in
the context of an ongoing mediation session, is also dynamic - not static in
nature. A party may start a mediation stating that he will not accept less than
$50,000 to settle the case; yet he walks out happily embracing a $37,500 settle-
ment. Thus, whatever truthfulness standard is adopted for mediators and media-
tion advocates, it must be able to accommodate the mediation process's integral
and unalterable truth-mutating nature and it must not interfere in any significant
way with mediation's conflict resolution purpose.
B. Rules must not significantly interfere with the means by which the players
can accomplish the game's purpose
That mediation's purpose is to resolve conflict says nothing of the means
that may be used to accomplish resolution. And that brings into focus the sec-
ond criteria for ethical rule design: the rule should not interfere in any signifi-
cant way with the means by which the mediator or the mediation advocate can
accomplish the purpose of mediation. The question that must be addressed here
is: may a good end justify any means? May truth be bent, colored, tinted, ve-
neered, or hidden by a mediator or mediation advocate if the result is achieving
a satisfactory resolution, or better yet, a win-win solution without harm to any
party? In short, is there such a thing as a noble lie? Our immediate instincts
beckon us to answer "no"; but the reality is that many of us lied to our children
so long about Santa Claus - with no catastrophic results and no tinge of shame
- that deep down we know that something like a "noble lie" exists and it's
okay. Thus, whatever truthfulness standard is adopted, it must accommodate, or
at least acknowledge, the concept of the "noble lie."
C. Rules must be comprehensible, reasonable, and fair
The third criteria for ethical rule design is that any imposed rule should be
comprehensible, and it should be reasonable and fair, both in its content and its
application. As to comprehensibility, an ethical rule must be stated clearly and
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unambiguously. A rule that is capable of various interpretations can produce
unfair, unwanted, and even nefarious results.
As to content, this third criterion stimulates inquiry into what types of com-
munication (written, verbal, or nonverbal) or withholding of information should
be prescribed or proscribed by the ethical rule; or whether there should be any
prescriptions or proscriptions at all. My own personal reaction to this question
currently is that it would make much more sense for the rules to proscribe cer-
tain specifically defined types of untruthful statements, behavior, conduct, or
omissions rather than use vague blanket terms like "false statement of material
fact or law." In this regard, a review of some of the literature on development of
conventions of truthfulness,4 untruthfulness,42 and good faith4 3 may be of some
help to the designers of the truthfulness standard for mediation.
As to the reasonable and fair application of an ethical rule, the third crite-
rion forces consideration of whether the same standard of truthfulness should
apply across the board to all participants in mediation whether they be lawyer or
nonlawyer mediators, lawyer-advocates, judges, or former judges. My intuitive
response is that the standard of truthfulness should be the same for all, unless
some exception can be identified and justified. Conceptually, there should be no
separate rules for judge-mediated cases as compared to non-lawyer or lawyer
mediated cases. The key is selecting a truthfulness standard that is capable of
both comprehension and compliance, and therefore respect. And this leads us to
the discussion of the fourth criteria for ethical rule design - the rules must be
capable of compliance by all persons whom they intend to regulate.
D. Rules must be capable of compliance by all of the game's players in all
situations
Whatever truthfulness standard is selected, there must be a final check to
determine whether all persons that the standard is designed to regulate can rea-
sonably be expected to comply with it in all predictable situations. This requires
a type of "troubleshooter" thinking to imagine the variety of ways that the truth-
fulness standard might come into play. There might be certain types of situa-
tions, party configurations, or claims or defense types in which the standard
needs to be modified by making it more or less rigorous or by limiting its appli-
cation in some way. By this process, it may be concluded that certain specific
exceptions to the truthfulness standards need to be provided and specifically
explained in the text of the rule or its accompanying comments. This criterion
also requires the designers to consider whether the mediator, for example,
41. See Guernsey, supra note 23, at 103.
42. Dahl, supra note 16, at 199.
43. Kimberly K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation -- Requested, Recommended, or Re-
quired? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 622 (1997).
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should be required to explain the "rules of the game" and truthfulness expecta-
tions at the beginning of the mediation, and if so, what the content of that expla-
nation should be.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In July, 1997 the American Bar Association established the Commission on
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, commonly known as "Ethics
2000" whose work is currently underway. Its purpose is to examine and con-
sider updating the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct in light of
changes in the legal profession, being brought about by new and developing
practice areas and by the impact of rapid innovations in global communications
and technology. The Chair of the Commission hopes to report to the ABA
House of Delegates at the Association's annual Meeting in July, 2000 - an
ambitious challenge, indeed, considering the breadth of the task and the com-
prehensiveness of the analysis that will be required. Some of the issues this
Commission will most likely be addressing will include complex ethical ques-
tions relating to the field of alternative dispute resolution - both mediation and
arbitration.' It is hoped that this article and the Mediation Magic article from
which it derives will offer the Commission some useful insights into the tasks of
defining the limits of acceptable deception by lawyers engaged in mediation and
of determining an appropriate truthfulness standard for lawyers in the practice of
law, generally.
44. Ethics of advocacy in mediation and arbitration seems to be a proper topic for the Com-
mission's work in revising the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Whether mediator and arbi-
trator ethics fall within the charge of this Commission is not altogether clear. It would seem more
appropriate to include consideration of the ethics of these two neutral functions - not currently
categorized as the practice of law - in connection with a revision of the ABA Model Code of Judi-
cial Conduct - which regulates another neutral, non-practice function of lawyers. It further seems
advisable, if not imperative, that a study and evaluation of the Model Rules and the Model Code
occur simultaneously so that any overlapping considerations can be fully developed, addressed, and
coordinated.
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